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Abstract: In a world where technology grows exponentially, more information is available to us every day. States and their 
governments have collected information on their citizens for a long time now. On the other hand, people give out more and 
more personal information voluntarily through social media. Information available on the Internet is easier to analyze with 
modern technologies and the original source of information is also easier to track down. Information is available to all of us 
and that information can be used to investigate personal data, defeat competitors in a corporate world, solve crimes or even 
win wars. This study analyses open source intelligence (OSINT) and big data analytics (BDA) with the emphasis on cyber 
reconnaissance and how personal security is part of that entity. The main question is how privacy manifests itself as part of 
OSINT and BDA. At the same time the study analyses how law enforcement authorities can act so that their reconnaissance 
actions would be publicly approved. The study uses case study methodology by gathering a comprehensive list of sources 
for the theory section. The theoretical framework consists of Privacy by Design approach and privacy questions with regard 
to surveillance, and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Directive 2016/680 ‘on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement 
of such data’ act as a legal framework. The empirical case dealing with maritime surveillance, explores OSINT and BDA privacy 
challenges in the MARISA project. The overall target of the paper is to accelerate the discussion on the serious problem of 
privacy breach that may lead to restrictions of individual liberty and erosion of our society's foundations of trust. 
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1. Introduction 
New surveillance technologies became omnipresent in our everyday live although surveillance has a bad 
reputation in most countries (Krempel & Beyerer, 2014). Open source intelligence (OSINT) is intelligence 
collected from publicly available sources, including the Internet, newspapers, radio, television, government 
reports and professional and academic literature (Glassman & Kang, 2012), and OSINT is being extensively used 
by local and national law enforcement authorities (LEAs), intelligence agencies and the military. An important 
aspect of LEAs use of OSINT is social media, which aggregate huge amounts of data generated by users which 
are in many cases identified or identifiable (Staniforth, 2016): “When combined with other online and stand-
alone datasets, this contributes to create a peculiar technological landscape in which the predictive ability that 
is Big Data Analytics (BDA) has relevant impact for the implementation of social surveillance systems.” BDA of 
OSINT requires the rigorous review and potential overhaul of existing intelligence models and associated 
processes, however, LEAs must always ensure that their access and use of publicly available information is within 
national and international legal frameworks (Staniforth, 2016). 
 
This case study, carried out by Yin’s (2009) framework, researches privacy issues of the MARitime Integrated 
Surveillance Awareness (MARISA) project in maritime surveillance domain. Maritime surveillance is essential for 
creating maritime awareness, in other words 'knowing what is happening at sea'. Integrated maritime 
surveillance is about providing authorities interested or active in maritime surveillance with ways to exchange 
information and data. Support is provided by responding to the needs of a wide range of maritime policies-
irregular migration/border control, maritime security, fisheries control, anti-piracy, oil pollution, smuggling etc. 
Also the global dimension of these policies is addressed, e.g. to help detect unlawful activities in international 
waters. Sharing data will make surveillance cheaper and more effective. Currently, EU and national authorities 
responsible for different aspects of surveillance collect data separately and often do not share them. As a result, 
the same data may be collected more than once. The European Commission and EU/EEA members develop a 
common information-sharing environment (CISE) that integrates existing surveillance systems and networks and 
gives all relevant authorities access to the information they need for their missions at sea. CISE will make 
different systems interoperable so that data can be exchanged easily through the use of modern technologies. 
 
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and/or the Directive 2016/680 ‘on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the 
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prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, 
and on the free movement of such data’ regulate processing of personal data in maritime surveillance. Privacy 
by Design (PbD) is one of the key requirements in both regulations. The purpose of this paper is to understand 
and build explanation what privacy means with regard to OSINT and BDA. The research questions is: How we 
can understand PbD in regard to the MARISA services? From the MARISA project’s point of view, the target of 
this case study is to provide research findings for the MARISA project’s second phase, in which the already 
developed MARISA services will be revised and enhanced, and additional services will be included. The overall 
target of the paper is to accelerate the discussion on the serious problem of privacy breach that may lead to 
restrictions of individual liberty and erosion of our society's foundations of trust. 
2. Theoretical framework 
2.1 Privacy by design 
Privacy by design (PbD) is an approach to systems engineering approach intended to ensure privacy protection 
from the earliest stages of a project and to be taken into account throughout the whole engineering process, 
not just in hindsight. The PbD concept is closely related to the concept of privacy enhancing technologies (PET) 
published in 1995 (Hustinx, 2010). PbD framework was published in 2009 (Cavoukian, 2011).The concept is an 
example of value sensitive design that takes human values into account in a well-defined manner throughout 
the whole process. PbD is one of the key requirements in the European Data Protection Reform beings included 
in GDPR and Directive 2016/680. The GDPR also requires Privacy by Default, meaning that the strictest privacy 
settings should be the default. 
 
According to Antignac and Le Métayer (2014), PbD related research has focused on technologies and 
components rather than methodologies and architectures. They advocate that PbD should be addressed at the 
architectural level and be associated with suitable methodologies, among other benefits, architectural 
descriptions enable a more systematic exploration of the design space. In addition, because privacy is 
intrinsically a complex notion that can be in tension with other requirements, they believe that formal methods 
should play a key role in this area (Antignac & Le Métayer, 2014). Kung (2014) continues the importance of 
architecture in designing a PbD system and provides an overview on how architectures are designed, analysed 
and evaluated, through quality attributes, tactics and architecture patterns. Kung also specifies a straw man 
architecture design methodology for privacy and present PEAR (Privacy Enhancing ARchitecture) methodology. 
Martin and Kung (2018) posit that for PbD to be viable, engineers must be effectively involved and endowed 
with methodological and technological tools closer to their mindset, and which integrate within software and 
systems engineering methods and tools. 
 
In many respects, original PbD framework has been criticized as being a vague concept. To make its underlying 
goals more concrete, Colesky Hoepman and Hillen (2016) propose a more specific privacy design strategy: 1) 
minimize: only collect that data which is strictly necessary, and remove that which no longer is; 2) hide: encrypt, 
pseudonymize, and take other measures that protect and obscure links between elements of data and their 
source; 3) abstract: reduce the granularity of data collected; combine or aggregate data from multiple sources 
so that the sources are no longer uniquely identifiable; 4) separate: store and access data only where it is used; 
process data at the source instead of centrally; 5) inform: explain to data subjects how their personal data is 
processed, and how profiles and automated decision-making based on their personal data work. A subject can 
only provide valid consent to data processing if they understand how their data is being processed; 6) control: 
allow data subjects to provide and revoke consent to process, and to access, correct, and delete their provided 
and derived data: 7) enforce: build technical and organizational measures that ensure the design decisions taken 
with regard to privacy are actually implemented, and log the actions of the systems; and 8) demonstrate: 
document, audit, and report on the operational and PbD processes. The first four strategies are more focused 
on data and the last four are about policies and the surrounding processes. Given these strategies, the PbD 
process could then ideally be implemented as follows (Van Aubel, et al., 2018): “look at each project 
requirement, figure out what potential privacy impacts it has, and apply strategies to mitigate those impacts”. 
This iterative process should be repeated as the design becomes more detailed (Van Aubel, et al., 2018). 
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2.2 Privacy and surveillance 
The PARIS (PrivAcy pReserving Infrastructure for Surveillance) project (2013-2015) defined and demonstrated a 
methodological approach for the development of a surveillance infrastructure which enforces the right of 
citizens for privacy, justice and freedom. The project took into account the evolving nature of such rights, since 
aspects that are acceptable today might not be acceptable in the future. It also included the social and ethical 
nature of such rights, since the perception of such rights varies over time and in different countries. Its 
methodological approach was based on two pillars: 1) a theoretical framework for balancing surveillance and 
privacy/data protection which fully integrates the concept of accountability; and 2) an associated process for 
the design of surveillance systems which takes from the start privacy (i.e. Privacy-by-Design) and accountability 
(i.e. Accountability-by-Design). 
 
Koops (2013) concerns procedural issues of OSINT in police investigations and investigates criminal-procedure 
law in relation to open source data gathering by the police. He studies the international legal context for 
gathering data from openly accessible and semi-open sources, including the issue of cross-border gathering of 
data. This analysis is used to determine if investigating open sources by the police in the Netherlands is allowed 
on the basis of the general task description of the police, or whether a specific legal basis and appropriate 
authorization is required for such systematic observation or intelligence. The line between espionage and OSINT 
can be very thin, therefore caution and double-checking are advised before conducting OSINT activities (Hribar, 
et al., 2014). 
 
Koops, Hoepman and Leenes (2013) considers the challenge of embedding PbD in OSINT carried out by law 
enforcement. Ideally, the technical development process of OSINT tools is combined with legal and ethical 
safeguards in such a way that the resulting products have a legally compliant design, are acceptable within 
society, and at the same time meet in a sufficiently flexible way the varying requirements of different end-user 
groups. They use the analytic PbD framework and they discusses two promising approaches, revocable privacy 
and policy enforcement language. The approaches are tested against three requirements that seem suitable for 
a ‘compliance by design’ approach in OSINT: purpose specification; collection and use limitation and data 
minimization; and data quality (up-to-datedness). For each requirement, they analyze whether and to what 
extent the approach could work to build in the requirement in the system. They demonstrates that even though 
not all legal requirements can be embedded fully in OSINT systems, it is possible to embed functionalities that 
facilitate compliance in allowing end-users to determine to what extent they adopt PbD approach when 
procuring an OSINT platform, extending it with plug-ins, and fine-tuning it to their needs. Therefore, developers 
of OSINT platforms and networks have a responsibility to make sure that end-users are enabled to use PbD, by 
allowing functionalities such as revocable privacy and a policy enforcement language (Koops, et al., 2013). Even 
though actual end-users have a responsibility of their own for ethical and legal compliance, it is important to 
recognize that it is questionable whether all responsibility for a proper functioning and use of OSINT platforms 
can be ascribed to the end-users; and some responsibility for a proper functioning of OSINT framework in 
practice also lies with the developers of the platform and individual components (Guest Editorial, 2013). 
3. Open source related MARISA services 
The MARISA toolkit provides a suite of services to correlate and fuse various heterogeneous and homogeneous 
data and information from different sources, including Internet and social networks. MARISA also aims to build 
on the huge opportunity that comes from using the open access to big data for maritime surveillance: the 
availability of large to very large amounts of data, acquired from various sources ranging from sensors, satellites, 
open source, internal sources and of extracting from these amounts through advanced correlation improves 
knowledge. The first phase MARISA service description document (MARISA, 2018) defines three open source 
related services: Twitter service, OSINT service and GDELT service. Next we will present those services. 
3.1 Twitter service  
Twitter is a popular and widely used social media platform for microblogging, or broadcasting short messages. 
Twitter has hundreds of millions of users worldwide, and they broadcast over every day 500 million messages, 
known as tweets that may include text, images, and links (Glasgow, 2015). In crisis management, Twitter can act 
as a human sensor network for real-time event detection, but little attention has been paid to applying text 
mining and natural language processing techniques to monitor events in a multilingual setting and most of the 
work focusses on one single language only (Zielinski, 2013). 
366
 
Jyri Rajamäki and Jussi Simola 
MARISA Twitter service enables access to open source social media information. Twitter is selected because its 
users are fast at creating content and an application program interface (API) is available. Many publications in 
the field of natural language processing are done using Twitter. MARISA Twitter service will read tweets via the 
Twitter search API. The input is the Area of Interest (AOI), which contains a geolocation (as point in lat/lon 
coordinates and a radius in km or miles) and the period of time. Each tweet is first analyzed for its language and 
then tokenized. A special classifier with a language and domain dependent model will assess the relevance of 
the tweet in this context (domain, use case). The result will be an instance of the Risk class defined in CISE 
containing a list of assessed tweets with their relevance exposed in the attributes RiskProbability, RiskSeverity 
and RiskLevel. MARISA Twitter service won’t correlate position information extracted from social media with 
known ship positions, as it will just give away all identified risks in a given area. An example may be illegal 
immigration. For the trained use case of illegal immigration, if the classifier delivers a relevance of i.e. 0.9, there 
is a high probability that the tweet is about a real immigration event. So the RiskProbability is frequent (01), the 
RiskSeverity is catastrophic (01) related to possible death of immigrants and the derived RiskLevel is high (01). 
(MARISA, 2018) 
 
The first function block ReadTweets consists of two parallel threads. The thread containing the functions 
BuildRequest and SendRequest handles the interpretation of the function argument (AOI) and the construction 
of the HTTP request for TwitterSearch API. The second thread in ReadTweets processes the HTTP response of 
the TwitterSearch API. If there are no tweets in the response an EmptyResponse object is built and the flow ends. 
Otherwise the tweets list is handed over to the AnalyseTweet function. In the AnalyseTweet function the critical 
operation is to detect the language of a tweet. All subsequent operations are dependent of the correct 
identification of the language of the short message. If the language is not successfully identified, an 
EmptyResponse object is built with an appropriate error code as return state. Upon successful language 
detection the tweet is tokenized with a special tokenizer which respects all the special controls and 
characteristics of a tweet. The tokenized tweets enter the ClassifyTweet function. This function’s building blocks 
FindClass and AssignRelevance are based on a DeepLearning concept using paragraph vectors and their vector 
space similarity characteristics. So two tweets are similar, if their corresponding (paragraph) vectors enclose a 
small angle in a multi-dimensional space (around 500 dimensions). After each tweet is processed, a Response 
object is built, containing the classification result, and the flow ends. (MARISA, 2018) 
3.2 GDELT service  
The Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT) is a CAMEO-coded dataset containing geo-located 
events with global coverage from 1979 to the present. The data are collected from news reports throughout the 
world and the dataset provides daily coverage on the events found in news reports published on that day. In 
2015, datasets Mentions and Global Knowledge Graph (GKG) were added to GDELT. The Mentions table records 
the network trajectory of the story of each event in flight through the global media system while the GKG table 
expands GDELTs ability to quantify global human society beyond cataloging physical occurrences towards 
actually representing all of the latent dimensions, geography, and network structure of the global news. Today, 
GDELT is a real time database of global human society for open research which monitors the world's broadcast, 
print, and web news, creating a free open platform for computing on the entire world containing three data 
tables: Event, Mentions and GKG while most researches are based only on the Event table (Chen, et al., 2016). 
GDELT archives an exhaustive collection of available online news sources in more than 100 languages (Guo & 
Vargo, 2017). 
 
MARISA GDELT service integrates open-source data from GDELT project into MARISA. It filters the results using 
natural language processing in order to identify possible events related to maritime domain, such as naval 
incidents, piracy events, and pollution events (MARISA, 2018). 
 
Satellite data represent major value adding maritime surveillance information outside the coastal systems 
coverage. Social media information such as Twitter provides no adjunct value offshore far from ports where 
online news sources based GDELT data are more relevant, including maritime events such as emergencies like 
sinking ships, collisions at sea, or information related to the conflicts in defending territorial waters. MARISA 
proves the capability and potentially the exportability to other areas and topics, further to the ones dealt with 
in the project. (MARISA, 2018) 
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OpenGeo Suite Web Feature Service is integrated in the MARISA toolkit that filters relevant events and news 
from GDELT data. The function exploits big data information extraction techniques from non-conventional 
sources. Via the MARISA toolkit, the user accesses OSINT data and reports relevant information to the maritime 
domain, classified per event type and with references, to enrich the maritime picture within the selected AOI. 
Current GDELT database queries have no correlation with vessels, but news relevant to a certain AOI will be 
extracted from the database and made available to the MARISA toolkit for a potential contextual analysis. 
(MARISA, 2018) 
3.3 OSINT service  
MARISA OSINT service involves the collection, analysis and use of data from open sources for intelligence 
purposes. It exploits existing open source solutions for social media data stream integration, especially Twitter 
web crawlers in order to provide capabilities for discovering of alert of any kind of illegal activities in the maritime 
environment. Multilingual investigations into social media, based mainly on the ability to identify geo-located 
information, allow to associate the OSINT information with more closely related to the marine environment 
information (e.g. vessels, sea condition, pollution risks) and then generate an improved maritime picture that 
meets cross-border requirements of the MARISA project. Depending on the search type that the user wants to 
perform (based on geographical locations or coordinates, dates or specific keywords that will be configured in a 
specific phase of the usage of the service) different API services have been applied inside the service code. OSINT 
service can search, identify and merge relevant multilingual events that can be considered as input to generate 
alert/incident/tracks. (MARISA, 2018) 
 
MARISA OSINT service receives parameter from the configuration (e.g. AOI, keywords), and on the basis of this, 
solves possible conflicts, receives tweets and after analysis propagate alarms as following: 1) TwitterRetriever 
provides a sort of orchestration of all service’s components; 2) OrganizerParmas_API valuates if there are 
conflicts or inconsistencies between the input parameters that would lead to a negative search result; 3) 
REST_APIsInvoker evaluates which representational state transfer API shall invoke, merge or sum the results; 4) 
LanguageDetection evaluates suitable Twitter APIs to invoke, merge or sum the results; and 5) AlarmPropagator 
informs if there are tweets coming from AOI and provides the link for retrieving. Depending on the search type 
the user wants to perform (based on geographical locations or date), different API services are applied inside 
the service code. Due to sophisticated combinations of criteria, Twitter service can search and identify the set 
of relevant tweets that can be considered as alert/incident and from which the list of coordinates can be 
extracted. (MARISA, 2018) 
4. Privacy challenges of MARISA OSINT and BDA services 
The MARISA toolkit was built on the top of a big data infrastructure that provides the means to collect external 
data sources and operational systems products and to organize and exploit all the incoming data as well as all 
the data produced by the various services. Next we look privacy challenges in four different dimensions of BDA: 
data generation, data analysis, use of data, and infrastructure behind data. 
4.1 Data generation 
Data generation can be classiﬁed into active data generation and passive data generation: active data generation 
means that the data owner will give the data to a third party, while passive data generation refers to the 
circumstances that the data are produced by data owner’s online actions (e.g., browsing) and the data owner 
may not know about that the data are being gathered by a third party (Jain, et al., 2016). 
 
The MARISA Toolkit has two relevant data sources: data coming from the sensors, and data coming from open 
sources. With regard to data coming from the sensors, these sensors are embodied in the operational 
environment of the Legacy Systems. Here Legacy Systems mean the previously existing end-users Maritime 
Surveillance systems in the National/Regional Coordination Centres or Coastal Stations to which MARISA Toolkit 
must establish some kind of communications. In these environments, owned by Participating Member State 
governmental entities, we can suppose that the data are used on the basis of need-to-know and need-to-share. 
Examples of those data from heterogeneous sources are radar and AIS tracks, AIS data validation, near real-time 
satellite detections and heat maps, integration of maps of most used routes (density maps) and traffic patterns, 
search and rescue risk maps, fusion of surveillance pictures information from end-users operational 
environments.  
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MARISA services include three services (Twitter service, GDELT service and OSINT service) that collect open 
source information. Their main target is to extract and integrate maritime related safety and security events. 
OSINT service mainly collects its information via Twitter service and DGELT service. From data collection point 
of view, MARISA GDELT service may not have privacy concerns because professional journalists should have 
taken that issue into account when making news. However other ethical issues may arise, for example wealthier 
countries not only continue to attract most of the world news attention, they are also more likely to decide how 
other countries perceive the world (Guo & Vargo, 2017). 
 
ln Twitter, several technical features and tweet-based social behaviors occur that might compromise privacy. 
Tweets are complex objects that, in addition to the message content, have many pieces of associated metadata, 
such as the username of the sender, the date and time the tweet was sent, the geographic coordinates the tweet 
was sent from if available, and much more (Glasgow, 2015). “Most metadata are readily interpretable by 
automated systems, whereas tweet message content may require text processing methods for any automated 
interpretation of meaning” (Glasgow, 2015). “Direct Messages” are the private side of Twitter and "retweeting" 
is directly quoting and rebroadcasting another user's tweet. Someone might unintentionally or intentionally 
retweet private tweet to a public forum. Other behaviors include mentioning another user in one's tweet that 
is, talking about that user. According to Rumbold and Wilson (2018), when one puts any information in the  
public  domain—whether intentionally or not—one does not waive one’s right to privacy, but one can only waive 
one’s right to privacy by actually waiving it. 
4.2 Data analytics 
Big data may be analyzed by artificial intelligence (AI). Machine learning (ML), a branch of AI, can provide 
detailed, personalized characteristics of an individual and prediction of his or her future behavior (Moallem, 
2019). According to Wójtowicz and Cellary (2019), one of the most important carateristics of BDA is the paradigm 
shift, in which instead of discovering knowledge by searching for causality, one can discover it by searching for 
correlation: it is possible via BDA to learn with high propability what is happening, and even what will happen, 
but not why it happens or why it will happen. If a human programmer writes a program, another human 
programmer may inspect program code and find possible errors, but if a neural network is trained by peta-bytes 
of data, nobody is able to check whether a particular prediction is correct or not (Moallem, 2019). 
 
Algorithms tell computers step by step how to solve a certain problem. However, predictive algorithms are often 
themselves unpredictable (Wójtowicz & Cellary, 2019). According to Rahman (2017), the first problem comes 
from algorithmic bias—AI algorithms being a reflection of the programmers’ biases—may possibly give rise to 
the risk of false alerts by AI surveillance systems thus resulting in wrongful profiling and arrest; and the second 
problem is that AI profiling systems utilise historical data to generate lists of suspects for the purposes of 
predicting or solving crimes. ML techniques including neural networks run in two phases (the training phase and 
the prediction phase) and the quality of predictions is absolutely dependent on examples used for the training 
phase. ML systems are only as good as the data sets that the systems trained and worked with (Rahman, 2017). 
4.3 Use of data 
Data analysis does not directly touch the individual and may have no external visibility. An important ethical 
issue comes with automated policing. Automated discrimination is possible when augmented surveillance 
becomes more common. It intersects with the technical issues of unintended biases in algorithms and big data 
that could skew analyses generated by AI systems (Rahman, 2017). If a person is wrongly qualified as a potential 
terrorist, the consequences may be very severe (Wójtowicz & Cellary, 2019). If BDA provides predictions with 
99% accuracy, wrong predictions would concern over 5 million people in the EU, which population is 508 million. 
Big Data used by law enforcement will increase the chances of certain tagged people to suffer from adverse 
consequences without the ability to get back or even having knowledge that they are being discriminated 
(Matturdi, et al., 2014). 
4.4 Infrastructure behind data 
Data analytics requires not just algorithms and data but also physical platforms where the data are stored and 
analysed. Cloud computing is currently the most economic option of providing computing power and storage 
capacity, and privacy assurance can be successfully deployed in private clouds. Although stored data are 
encrypted and advances in homomorphic encryption, there is no prospect of commercial systems being able to 
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maintain this encryption during real-time processing of large datasets (Wójtowicz & Cellary, 2019). The security 
and privacy for big data is not different from security and privacy research in general (Nelson & Olovsson, 2016). 
5. Summary and conclusion 
According to the European Data Protection Reform, PbD is a mandatory approach in maritime surveillance 
context. Although PbD as a concept is becoming well-known, it turns out that there is not much standardization 
in how to actually apply it, especially by security authorities. This paper explores privacy challenges in the 
MARISA project and tries to accelerate the discussion on the serious problem of privacy breach that may lead to 
restrictions of individual liberty and erosion of our society's foundations of trust. Current academic arguments 
are shifting the focus of privacy concerns from data collection to data analytics and data use, and there are 
scholars requiring “algorithmic accountability” (Broeders, et al., 2017). It can therefore be expected that the 
legal requirements concerning OSINT and BDA may develop into this direction. 
 
One very important issue is who watches the watchers (political issue) and how this can be carried out (technical 
issue). Utilizing BDA in the security domain requires intensive oversight (Broeders, et al., 2017). However, BDA 
is often a “black box”, and more research is needed, especially in the phase of the analysis: selecting the 
algorithms, data sources and categorization, assigning weight to various data, etc. 
Acknowledgements 
Acknowledgement is paid to the MARISA Maritime Integrated Surveillance Awareness project. This project is 
funded by the European Commission through the Horizon 2020 Framework under the grant agreement number 
740698. The sole responsibility for the content of this paper lies with the authors. It does not necessarily reflect 
the opinion of the European Commission or of the full project. The European Commission is not responsible for 
any use that may be made of the information contained therein. 
References 
Antignac, T. & Le Métayer, D., 2014. Privacy by Design: From Technologies to Architectures. In: Privacy Technologies and 
Policy. Cham: Springer, pp. 1-17. 
Broeders, D. et al., 2017. Big data and security policies: Towards a framework for regulating the phases of analytics and use 
of Big Data. Computer Law & Security Review, Volume 33, pp. 309-323. 
Cavoukian, A., 2011. Privacy by Design: The 7 Foundational Principles, Ontario: Information and Privacy Commissioner of 
Ontario. 
Chen, K., Qiao, F. & Wang, H., 2016. Correlation Analysis Using Global Dataset of Events, Location and Tone. 2016 IEEE First 
International Conference on Data Science in Cyberspace (DSC), pp. 648-652. 
Colesky, M., Hoepman, J.-H. & Hillen, C., 2016. A critical analysis of privacy design strategies”, Procs. IWPE’16, IEEE, 33–40.. 
2016 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW), pp. 33-40. 
Glasgow, K., 2015. Big data and law enforcement: Advances, implications, and lessons from an active shooter case study. 
In: Application of Big Data for National Security. Waltham: Butterworth-Heinemann, pp. 39-54. 
Glassman, M. & Kang, M. J., 2012. Intelligence in the internet age: the emergence and evolution of OSINT. Computers in 
Human Behavior, Volume 28, pp. 673-682. 
Guest Editorial, 2013. Legal aspects of open source intelligence - Results of the VIRTUOSO project. Computer law & security 
review, Volume 29, pp. 642-653. 
Guo, L. & Vargo, C., 2017. Global Intermedia Agenda Setting: A Big Data Analysis of International News Flow. Journal of 
Communication , pp. 499-520. 
Hribar, G., Podbregar, I. & Ivanusa, T., 2014. OSINT: A ‘‘Grey Zone’’?. International Journal of Intelligence and 
CounterIntelligence, Volume 27, p. 529–549. 
Hustinx, P., 2010. Privacy by design: delivering the promises. Identity in the Information Society, 3(2), pp. 253-255. 
Jain, P., Gyanchandani, M. & Khare, N., 2016. Big data privacy: a technological perspective and review. Journal of Big Data. 
Koops, B., 2013. Police investigations in Internet open sources: procedural law issues. Computer Law & Security Review, 
Volume 29, pp. 676-688. 
Koops, B., Hoepman, J. & Leenes, R., 2013. Open-source intelligence and privacy by design. Computer Law & Security 
Review, Volume 29, pp. 676-688. 
Krempel, E. & Beyerer, J., 2014. TAM-VS: A Technology Acceptance Model for Video Surveillance. In: Privacy Technologies 
and Policy. Cham: Springer, pp. 86-100. 
Kung, A., 2014. PEARs: Privacy Enhancing ARchitectures. In: Privacy Technologies and Policy. Cham: Springer, pp. 18-29. 
MARISA, 2018. D3.2 MARISA SERVICES DESCRIPTION DOCUMENT, s.l.: s.n. 
Martín, Y.-S. & Kung, A., 2018. Methods and Tools for GDPR Compliance through Privacy and Data Protection Engineering. 
2018 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops, pp. 108-111. 
Matturdi, B., Zhou, X., Li, S. & Lin, F., 2014. Big Data security and privacy: A review. China Communications, pp. 135-145. 
370
 
Jyri Rajamäki and Jussi Simola 
Moallem, A., 2019. Perspectives on the future of human factors in cybersecurity. In: Human-computer interaction and 
cybersecurity handbook. Boca Ratom: CRC Press, pp. 353-366. 
Nelson, B. & Olovsson, T., 2016. Security and privacy for big data: A systematic literature review. 2016 IEEE International 
Conference on Big Data (Big Data), pp. 3693-3702. 
Rahman, F., 2017. Smart Security: Balancing Effectiveness and Ethics. RSIS Commentary, 14 Dec.Volume 235. 
Rumbold, B. & Wilson, J., 2018. Privacy Rights and Public Information. The Journal of Political Philosophy. 
Staniforth, A., 2016. Big Data and open source intelligence – A game-changer for counter-terrorism?. TRENDS Research & 
Advisory, 19 July.  
Van Aubel, P. et al., 2018. Privacy by design for local energy communities. Ljubljana, s.n. 
Wójtowicz, A. & Cellary, W., 2019. New challenges for user privacy in cyberspace. In: Human-computer interaction and 
cybersecurity handbook. Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis Group, pp. 77-96. 
Yin, R. K., 2009. Case Study Research Design and Methods. s.l.:Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Zielinski, A., 2013. Detecting natural disaster events on twitter across languages. Intelligent interactive multimedia systems 
and services. 6th International onference on Intelligent Interactive Multimedia Systems and Services, pp. 291-301. 
371
xviii 
Jyri Rajamäki is Principal Lecturer in Information Technology at Laurea University of Applied Sciences and 
Adjunct Professor of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Cyber Security at University of Jyväskylä, Finland. He 
holds D.Sc. degrees in electrical and communications engineering from Helsinki University of Technology, and 
PhD degree in mathematical information technology from University of Jyväskylä. 
Dr Trishana Ramluckan a Post- Doctoral Researcher in International Cyber Law, College of Law and 
Management Studies, UKZN. Her areas of research include IT and Governance. She is a member of the IFIP 
working group on ICT Uses in Peace and War and is an Academic Advocate for ISACA.  
Juhani Rauhala is a Research Affiliate and PhD student of cybersecurity at the University of Jyväskylä. He has 
over ten years' experience in the telecommunications industry and has been awarded two patents related to 
cloud storage. Juhani is a designated Eur Ing by the Federation of European Engineers and holds BScEE (1992) 
and an MScE (1996) degrees from San Francisco State University. His research interests include the 
weaponization of ubiquitous technologies and technology abuse. 
Dr. Aunshul Rege is an Associate Professor with the Department of Criminal Justice at Temple University. Her 
cybercrime/security research on adversarial decision-making and adaptation, organizational and operational 
dynamics, and proactive cybersecurity is funded by several National Science Foundation grants.  
Dr. Mari Ristolainen is a Researcher at the Finnish Defence Research Agency. She has studied psychology at 
the Moscow State University and she earned a doctorate in Russian Language and Cultural Studies from the 
University of Joensuu in 2008. She has been conducting postdoctoral research in the field of Russian and 
Border Studies in several Academy of Finland- and EU-funded projects at the University of Eastern Finland and 
at the University of Tromso, Norway. Her current research interests include cyber warfare as a phenomenon, 
Russian digital sovereignty, and the governance of cyber/information space. 
M.Sc. (Cognitive Science) Tarja Rusi is a Cyber Security Master’s student (University of Jyväskylä, Finland).  She 
has 20+ years career in the telecommunications industry and has been lecturing on cyber threats and cyber 
terrorism. She has participated in governmental cyber threat evaluation work.  Research interests: critical 
infrastructure protection, cyber threats, cyber terrorism, state sponsored cyber-attacks.  
Helvi Salminen has worked in information security since June 1990. Before her security career 12 years of 
experience in systems development. Helvi is founder member of Finnish Information Security Association and 
president of ISACA Finland Chapter Helvi is qualified CISA, CISSP & SABSA & was awarded as CISO of the year in 
Finland 2014. 
Dr. Char Sample is research fellow for ICF Inc. at the US Army Research Laboratory in Maryland, and is a 
visiting academic at the University of Warwick, UK. She has over 20 years experience in the information 
security industry and focuses her research on Fake News, cultural values in cyber security events, and data 
resilience. 
Leonel Santos is an Equiv. Assistant Professor at Polytechnic Institute of Leiria. He is a researcher on the 
Computer Science and Communication Research Centre and is a PhD student in University of Trás-os-Montes e 
Alto Douro. His major research interests include Cybersecurity, Information and Networks Security, Internet of 
Things, Intrusion Detection Systems and Computer Forensics. 
Mr. Lynn Scheinman is a technology consultant specialising in defence, security, and applied data science at 
SAP in Walldorf, Germany. He received his Masters in Science of Project Management and Operations 
Research at Florida Institute of Technology. His defence experience comes from 10 years in the US Army 
Special Forces as a Green Beret.  
Dr Keith Scott is the Subject Leader for Languages at De Montfort University, where he is also a member of the 
Cyber Security Centre. He is also a member of the Cyber Policy Centre, a UK-based independent public policy 
centre devoted exclusively to the consideration of cyber as a socio-technical phenomenon. His research 
interests include the social and cultural implications of ‘cyber’ as a concept, influence, online communication, 
and the use of gaming as a teaching and research tool. 
xix 
Youngsup Shin is a researcher in Agency for Defense Development, South Korea. He is in an integrated PhD 
program in Korea University. His main research areas are cyber situational awareness and cyber warfare. 
Ph.D. Petteri Simola is a senior psychologist at the Finnish Defence Research Agency, Human Performance 
Division. His work involves human aspects of information security, Human Factors (especially sleep) and 
aptitude testing in recruitment. 
Jussi Simola is a PhD student of cyber security in University of Jyväskylä. His area of expertise includes decision 
support technologies, SA systems, information security and continuity management. His current research is 
focused on effects of cyber domain as a part of Hybrid Emergency Response Model. 
Mr Veikko Siukonen is a research officer at Finnish Defence Research Agency (FDRA).  He resieved his  
Master's Degree in Military Sciences from The National Defence University in 2007. He is a master of science 
student (cyber security program) in University of Jyvaskyä. His main research areas are cyber warfare and 
cyber threat intelligence. 
Tiia Sõmer is early stage researcher at Tallinn University of Technology. She is conducting PhD level studies, 
focusing on modelling cyber criminal journey mapping. In addition to research she does teaching and has co-
authored educational materials for general education. Before starting academic career, she served for more 
than twenty years in the Estonian defence forces.  
Lee Speakman, Lee gained his PhD in the area of Mobile Ad hoc Networks from Niigata, Japan, in 2009. Since 
then Lee worked in the area of networks, network security, and software exploitation and protection 
measures in Defence. Lee joined the University of Chester in 2015 to develop and deliver the University’s new 
Cybersecurity programmes and research. 
Ilona Stadnik is a PhD student at the School of International Relations, Saint-Petersburg State University, 
Russia. During 2018-2019 academic year she was a Fulbright visiting researcher at Georgia Institute of 
Technology, USA, working with Internet Governance Project.  She has been a regular participant and speaker 
at major cybersecurity events such as the United Nations Internet Governance Forum (IGF), CyFy conference, 
European Dialogue on Internet Governance (EuroDIG). Her research covers international cyber norm-making, 
Russia-US relations in cybersecurity, and global Internet governance. 
Dr. Nikolai Stoianov is Colonel in the Bulgarian armed forces, Deputy Director of the Bulgarian Defence 
Institute “Prof. Tsvetan Lazarov” and principal member of NATO’s Science and Technology Board. He is also 
associate professor and leads several international research projects on cybersecurity and related issues.  
Mr Marcel Stolz is a doctoral student in cyber security at the University of Oxford, UK. He has a background in 
Computer Science and has served as a First Lieutenant in the Swiss Armed Forces. His research interests lie in 
global cyber security and regulation of data companies, such as Facebook. 
Dr. Steven Templeton is a researcher at the University of California, Davis, USA. Since 1999 he has operated a 
consulting firm specializing in ICS security and compliance. Originally a wildlife biologist, in 2018 he received 
his PhD in computer science. His research spans multiple area of computer security, in particular intrusion 
detection, monitoring, and attack modelling. 
Dr Ben Turnbull is a Senior Lecturer for the University of New South Wales, Australia. He is an expert in cyber 
security and digital forensics with 16 years in the industry. He is also a Certified Information Systems Security 
Professional (CISSP). He has previously worked as a research scientist for the Defence Science and Technology 
Organisation in the field of cyber network defence and analysis. In his spare time, Ben plays too many card and 
board games.  
Maija Turunen is a PhD Student at the Finnish National Defense University. Her main research areas consist of 
cyber warfare, Russia and strategic communication. Maija Turunen works as a legal counsel at the Finnish 
Transport Infrastructure Agency. 
